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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The District Court Erred In Granting Coleman's And McGhee's Motions To 
Dismiss 
A. The Five-Second Signal Requirement Of Idaho Code § 49-808(2) 
Unambiguously Applies In Two Circumstances: (1) When A Driver Is On 
A Controlled-Access Highway, And (2) When A Driver Is Turning From A 
Parked Position 
The district court granted Coleman's and McGhee's motions to dismiss 
because, it concluded, the five-second signal requirement of I.C. § 49-808(2) 
unambiguously applies only when a vehicle "is both (1) on a controlled access 
highway, and (2) turning from a parked position." (R., p.70.) The district court 
erred. 
In State v. Brooks, Docket 41046, 2014 Opinion No. 77 (Idaho App., Sept. 
24, 2014), the Idaho Court of Appeals held, exactly contrary to the district court's 
interpretation of the statute in this case, that: 
[W]hen read in the context of the entire statute and in a manner 
that gives effect to all of its words and provisions, the plain, 
obvious, and rational meaning of the language of I.C. § 49-808(2) 
requires that a vehicle signal for at least five continuous seconds 
(1) when traveling on a controlled-access highway and (2) when 
truing from a parked position (regardless of the type of roadway on 
which the vehicle is parked); in all other circumstances, a vehicle 
must signal for at least the last 100 feet traveled before turning. 
Brooks, 2014 Opinion No. 77 at 7. The state recognizes Brooks is not yet final. 
Nevertheless, for the reasons cited therein, as well as those set forth in the 
state's opening brief (see Appellant's brief, pp.5-16), the state maintains the 
district court erred in its determination that Coleman, who was travelling in a 
vehicle with McGhee on a controlled-access highway, was not subject to the five-
second signal requirement of I.C. § 49-808(2). 
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8. Coleman Was Required By The Plain And Unambiguous Language Of 
I.C. § 49-808(2) To Signal Her Intention To Change Lanes For Five 
Continuous Seconds Before Actually Doing So 
As an alternative basis for affirming the district court's order granting their 
motions to dismiss, Coleman and McGhee argue: 
If this Court adopts the State's argument that "the legislature 
intended [the placement of the word 'and'] between the phrases 
'[o]n controlled-access highways' and 'before turning from a parked 
position' simply to indicate there is more than one circumstance, or 
'instance,' in which the five-second signal requirement applies" 
(Appellant's Brief, p.9), this Court must necessarily also find that 
the legislature specifically required the 5-second signaling period 
be completed before turning from a parked position, but did not 
require that the entire 5-second signaling period to [sic] occur 
before changing lanes. 
(Respondent's brief, pp.15-16 (emphasis in original)). This argument is without 
merit because it is contrary to the plain language of the statute. 
It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that a statute must 
be interpreted according to its plain language and so that effect is given to its 
every word and clause. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, _, 318 P.3d 955, 
960 (Ct. App. 2013). The first sentence of I.C. § 49-808(2) states: "A signal of 
intention to turn or move right of left when required shall be given continuously to 
warn other traffic." (Emphases added). The second sentence then provides: 
"On controlled-access highways and before turning from a parked position, the 
signal shall be given continuously for not Jess than five (5) seconds and, in all 
other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the 
vehicle before turning." I.C. § 49-808(2) (emphasis added). 
Based on a plain reading of this language, there can be no doubt that "the 
signal" referred to in the second sentence of the statute is the same "signal" 
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already described in the first sentence - i.e., "[a] signal of intention to turn or 
move right or left." Read together, these two sentences unambiguously require 
drivers on controlled-access highways to signal their "intention" to move right or 
left (i.e., change lanes) for five continuous seconds before actually doing so, for 
the purpose of "warning other traffic." 
Because the plain language of I.C. § 49-808(2) requires drivers to signal 
their "intention" to change lanes for five continuous seconds, such five-second 
signal must necessarily occur before the lane change actually occurs. To hold 
otherwise would render the words "intention" and "warn" in the statute wholly 
superfluous. Because Coleman only signaled her "intention" to change lanes for 
three seconds before actually doing so (see R., p.68 (and footnote 1 therein); 
Respondent's brief, p.23 ("It is undisputed that Ms. Coleman signaled for 3 
second prior to changing lanes .... ")), the traffic stop was justified by reasonable 
suspicion that Coleman violated the five-second signal requirement of I.C. § 49-
808(2). Coleman's and McGhee's arguments to the contrary are without merit. 
C. Because I.C. § 49-808(2) Plainly And Unambiguously Required Coleman 
To Signal Continuously For Five Seconds Before Changing Lanes On A 
Controlled-Access Highway, Coleman's And McGhee's Argument That 
The Statute Is Unconstitutionally Vague As Applied To Coleman's 
Conduct Necessarily Fails 
As a second alternative basis for affirming the district court's order 
granting their motions to dismiss, Coleman and McGhee argue that any 
ambiguity in I.C. § 49-808(2) renders the statute void for vagueness, as it applied 
to Coleman's conduct. This argument fails on its premise. Idaho Code § 49-
808(2) is not ambiguous but, rather, plainly requires drivers travelling on 
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controlled-access highways to signal for five continuous seconds before 
changing lanes. State v. Brooks, Docket 41046, 2014 Opinion No. 77 (Idaho 
App., Sept. 24, 2014). (See also Appellant's brief, pp.5-13.) Because the 
statute unambiguously applied to Coleman's conduct, Coleman's and McGhee's 
argument the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied necessarily fails. 1 
State v. Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 318 P.3d 962 (2014) (citing State v. Korsen, 138 
Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003); State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 35,218 
P.3d 10, 14 (Ct. App. 2009)) (statute is vague as applied only if it "failed to 
provide fair notice that the complainant's conduct was prohibited or failed to 
provide sufficient guidelines such that police had unbridled discretion in 
determining whether to charge the complainant"). 
1 Even if the statute were ambiguous, Coleman's and McGhee's vagueness 
challenge would be irrelevant to the suppression issue in this case. The United 
States Supreme Court has held that a constitutionally valid seizure is not 
rendered invalid by a subsequent determination that the law on which the seizure 
was based is unconstitutionally vague. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 
37 (1979); see also United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir. 1999). 
But see Burton v. State of Idaho, Dep't of Transp., 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 933 
(Ct. App. 2010) (reversing administrative license suspension on grounds that "no 
legal cause existed to effectuate" traffic stop because statute on which stop was 
based was unconstitutionally vague as applied to Burton's conduct)'. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
order dismissing Coleman's and McGhee's cases, and remand for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 30th day of September 2014. 
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